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Abstract
This paper develops a quality-ladder type dynamic general equilibrium model with
endogenous innovation and technology licensing as a major source of international
technology transfer in developing countries. Examining the dynamic characteristics
of the model fully, we explore the short- and long-run effects of both an improvement
in the probability of reaching a licensing agreement with a given effort and an increase
in the license fee rate. The model shows that the former promotes innovation and tech-
nology transfers in both the long and short run, while the latter discourages them.
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1 Introduction
Advanced technologies possessed by firms in developed countries are necessary for the in-
dustrialization of developing countries. Many countries that are now developed benefited
from imported advanced technologies. For example, countries in Europe and the US im-
ported many technologies from Britain, while Japan and Korea acquired technologies from
Western economies. As these examples show, technology acquisition is indispensable for
development.
Advanced foreign technologies are transferred with licensing, foreign direct investment
(FDI), illegal imitation and trade as typical examples. Japan and Korea preferred licensing to
FDI, especially in the early stages of their development following World War II.1 In this pa-
per, we construct a quality-ladder type dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous
innovation and technology licensing to investigate the international transfer of technology
through licensing activities.
Based on the product-cycle model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991), Yang
and Maskus (2001) have already constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model in which
the channel of technology transfer is licensing. Yang and Maskus (2001) explored how
strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection affects innovation and technology
transfer through licensing. They showed that stronger IPR raise innovation and technology
transfer through the reduction of licensing costs and improvements in the licensor’s share of
rents. Their conclusions have important implications for developing countries that are eager
to learn from the experiences of Japan and Korea, as both tended to adopt the purchase of
foreign advanced technologies; that is, licensing.
Although Yang and Maskus’ analysis has some interesting findings and makes a contri-
bution to the theory of technology transfer, we further enhance their analysis in two respects.
First, differently to Yang and Maskus, we consider the situation where the effort of firms that
1See Peck (1976), Ozawa (1980), and Enos and Park (1988). See also Pack and Saggi (1997).
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aim to be granted a license is important in reaching agreement on the license. In Yang and
Maskus’ model, it is assumed that the North, which possesses advanced technologies, uses
its resources for licensing activities. However, Peck (1976), Ozawa (1980), and Enos and
Park (1988) argue that most licensing efforts are undertaken by recipient countries, as oc-
curred in the case of Japan and Korea.2 Therefore, to ensure the model matches better with
the experiences of these countries, we modify Yang and Maskus’ model in the following
way: the parties who must make the effort to reach license agreement are firms in the recip-
ient country (the South), and they must use the resources of the recipient country.
Second, and theoretically more importantly, we analyze not only the steady state but also
the transitional dynamics of the model. Yang and Maskus analyzed only the steady state
and consequently did not explore the dynamic nature of their model. With the exception
of Helpman (1993) and Arnold (2002), other studies on international technology transfer
also often focus only on the steady state. To focus on the steady state can be allowed as
a first approach if the dynamic system of the model has a stable equilibrium path to the
steady state. However, the dynamic system actually becomes totally unstable in Yang and
Maskus’ setting (where the North, which has advanced technologies, uses its resources for
licensing activities).3 As a result, their model has no equilibrium path converging to the
steady state. By contrast, we show that there exists a stable equilibrium path; that is, a stable
saddle path in our setting (where firms in the recipient country must make the effort to gain
licenses and use the resources of the recipient country). Thus, our setting where firms in the
recipient country make the effort not only corresponds to actual experience but also appears
reasonable from the viewpoint of macroeconomic theory.
Because the instability of the steady state in Yang and Maskus’ model implies that the
economy never leads to the steady state analyzed in their work, we reexamine their policy
2A famous episode is the ‘pilgrimage to Montecatini’. Many Japanese firms visited Montecatini—an Italian
company that succeeded in converting propylene into a fiber-forming polypropylene—in order to obtain a
licensing agreement. See Ozawa (1980).
3The proof is available from the authors on request.
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analysis using a model with a stable equilibrium path, as developed in this paper. By reinter-
preting their model somewhat, we separately explore the effects of the following changes:
namely, an improvement in the “smoothness” of the licensing negotiation, which is repre-
sented by an increase in the probability of reaching license agreement with a given negoti-
ation effort, and a rise in the license fee rate. Both are regarded by Yang and Maskus as a
consequence of strengthening IPR protection. Based on the dynamic analysis of the model,
we explore both the long- and short-run effects. Examining the short-run effect is one ad-
vantage of our approach because many studies, including Yang and Maskus, analyzed only
the steady state representing the long-run state of the economy.4
The short-run effects are well deserving of consideration for at least two reasons. First,
there is the possibility that the short-run effects will run in the opposite direction to the
long-run effects. If a policy has opposite effects in the long run and in the short run, the
policy must be assessed more carefully.5 Second, the speed of convergence suggested by
endogenous growth models may be slow.6 The low speed of convergence is also supported
empirically. For example, in the context of convergence across regions in some countries,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) conclude that “it takes 25–35 years to eliminate one-half of
an initial gap in per capita incomes” (p.496). The low speed of adjustment after a policy
change implies that the short-run effects of the change can be more important than the long-
run effects.7 Thus, the analyses of the short-run effects are quite meaningful to economists
and policy makers.
4Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2006) examined the short-run effects of strengthening IPR protection on
innovation, although they also only focused on the steady state.
5This is also true of Helpman’s (1993) model. In that model, strengthening intellectual property rights
protection enhances innovation in the short run but reduces innovation in the long run. Therefore Helpman
(1993) fully examined the short-run effect.
6See, for example, Steger (2003). He examined the speed of convergence in the quality-ladder type endoge-
nous growth model in Segerstrom (1998) and showed that the speed of convergence is low through calibration
of the model. Our North–South growth model is also based on a quality-ladder model.
7Many theoretical studies of macroeconomics regarded the speed of convergence as important and ex-
amined it in the context of the various types of growth models. In particular, Ortigueira and Santos (1997)
examined the speed of convergence in endogenous growth models with adjustment costs and showed that the
speed of convergence may be slow. This result implies that it is necessary to examine the transitional dynamics
as well as the steady states.
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As a result of the analysis, we obtain two main conclusions. First, an improvement in
the smoothness of licensing negotiation encourages innovation and technology transfer in
both the long and short run. Second, an increase in the license fee rate is detrimental to
innovation and technology transfer in both the long and short run. In addition, we show that
an improvement in the smoothness of licensing negotiation increases the wage rate in the
South, while the increase in the license fee rate reduces the wage rate. Because it is difficult
to determine the effects on the relative wage rate, we present some numerical examples
concerning the relationships between these changes and the relative wage rate.
Although we investigate technology transfer to developing countries through licensing,
the present paper also relates to earlier studies that deal with the issue of innovation and
technology transfer through channels other than licensing. For instance, Helpman (1993)
constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model in which Northern firms innovate and
Southern firms imitate. He showed that although stronger IPR increase Northern innovation
in the short run, they reduce it in the longer run.8 More recently, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2006) developed a dynamic North–South model with scale-invariant growth and endoge-
nous imitation.9 On the other hand, some studies incorporated FDI into their models. Lai
(1998) showed that strengthening Southern IPR increases innovation and technology trans-
fers when FDI is the channel of transfer but reduces such transfers when imitation is the
channel of transfer. By contrast, Glass and Saggi (2002b) showed that stronger IPR decrease
the level of innovation and technology transfer in a dynamic model where both imitation and
FDI are the channels of production transfer. Because these models did not introduce licens-
ing activities in their frameworks, our model will complement these studies and enable us to
understand innovation and technology transfer better.10
8Arnold (2002) suggests that Helpman’s (1993) results concerning the long-run effect no longer hold when
labor mobility among industries in the North is imperfect.
9In order to remove scale effects, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2006) assumed like Segerstrom (1998) and
Li (2001) that the difficulty of R&D increases with innovation (and imitation). Moreover, Sener (2006) ex-
tended the scale-invariant growth model of Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2006), which includes rent protection
activities, into a North–South product-cycle model.
10Glass and Saggi (2002a) examined a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms can choose the
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
section 3, we derive the equilibrium path of the model and show that there exists a unique
equilibrium path converging to the steady state. In section 4, we consider the short- and
long-run effects of a change in the smoothness of licensing negotiations and the license fee
rate on the equilibrium path. In this section, we also compare the results with those in Yang
and Maskus. In section 5, we make a comparison between our technology licensing model
and the endogenous imitation models. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model based on Yang and Maskus (2001), where
licensing is introduced into a quality-ladder model as a means of international technical dif-
fusion. Our model has the same basic structure as Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.12).11
Consider an economy consisting of two regions, North and South, denoted by N and
S, respectively. There is a continuum of goods, indexed by ! 2 [0; 1], that are produced
in the North or the South. Each product is classified by a countable infinite number of
qualities j = 0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ , and its quality improves if innovation occurs in the industry. Product
! of quality j can be produced after the jth innovation in the industry !, and the quality
is provided by qj(!) = ¸j , where the increment of quality, ¸ > 1, is identical for all
products. As described below, the process of climbing the quality ladder requires research
and development by firms. We choose our units appropriately so that the quality at time
t = 0 equals unity in all industries.
mode of technology transfer (FDI or licensing). However, in contrast to our study and those discussed earlier,
they assumed that the two countries were identical.
11Although a ‘scale effect’ remains in our model, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), we follow Yang and
Maskus (2001) in not attempting to remove it. Regarding the scale-effect problem, Temple (2003) concluded
that it is unlikely the debate will be resolved empirically.
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Consumers living in both regions have identical preferences as follows:
U =
Z 1
0
e¡½t log u(t)dt; (1)
where ½ is a common subjective discount rate and log u(t) represents the instantaneous util-
ity at time t. We specify the instantaneous utility function as:
log u(t) =
Z 1
0
log
"X
j
qj(!)dj;t(!)
#
d!;
where dj;t(!) denotes the consumption of good ! of quality j at time t. The represen-
tative consumer maximizes his or her intertemporal utility (1) under the following budget
constraint: Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 r(s)dsE(t)dt = A(0);
where r(t) is the interest rate that consumers in both countries face at time t and A(0) is the
sum of initial asset holdings and discounted total labor income. The term E(t) represents
the flow of spending at time t, namely:
E(t) =
Z 1
0
"X
j
pj;t(!)dj;t(!)
#
d!;
where pj;t(!) is the price of product ! of quality j at time t.
As is well established, the consumer’s utility maximization problem can be solved in
two stages. In the first stage, the consumer allocates his or her spending E(t) to maximize
log u(t), given prices at time t. To solve this static problem, the consumer allots identical
expenditure shares to all products. Then, for each product, the consumer chooses the single
quality j = Jt(!) that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price pj;t(!)=qj;t(!). This implies
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the following static demand function:
dj;t(!) =
8><>:E(t)=pj;t(!) for j = Jt(!);0 otherwise:
In the second stage, the consumer chooses the time pattern of spending to maximize his
or her utility (1). This intertemporal utility maximization requires that _E(t)=E(t) = r(t)¡½.
By taking the aggregate spending as the numeraire, we normalize E(t) = 1 for all t so that
the interest rate r(t) always corresponds to the subjective discount rate ½.12
Turning to the production side, we assume that each economy has a single primary pro-
duction factor in the form of labor. The amount of total labor supply is constant in each
country but varies between countries. We assume that one unit of output requires one unit of
labor input. In addition, research activities and licensing negotiations to win a license from
a patent holder require labor inputs as discussed below.
Firms are separated into two types, ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’. Leaders are firms with
the ability to produce goods at the highest level of quality currently available, whereas all
other firms are followers. A general feature of this kind of model is that industrial leaders
do not intend to invest in further research and development of their products as long as the
products are not imitated. In this model, we assume no imitation occurs in equilibrium,
so that industrial leaders have no incentive to invest in further R&D. Therefore, whenever
innovation takes place in the industry, the incumbent leader must have been overtaken by a
follower in terms of product quality.
Firms are distinguished in terms of their location; that is, whether they are in the North
or in the South. We assume that Northern firms only have the ability to conduct R&D and
bring state-of-the-art products to the market. Hence, only Northern followers drive quality
improvements. The Northern firms that succeed in innovating and becoming quality leaders
12This normalization is a convenient method for examining the dynamic behavior of the economy. See
Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.12).
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acquire patents in the North. In addition, they can export their goods to the South without
facing any transportation costs or tariffs.
Southern firms can offer a Northern leader a license contract such that they acquire the
rights to produce and sell an invention of a Northern firm in exchange for royalty payments.
When granted the license, the Southern firm receives the blueprint of the highest-quality
product and acquires sufficient knowledge to manufacture it. Moreover, the firm can legally
sell the product to the entire world. However, Southern licensees must pay a part of the rents
from the sale of the product to their licensors as a license fee, until the product is replaced
by a new product of higher quality. We assume that the Southern licensee receives an exoge-
nously determined share of the rent from sales, which reflects the bargaining power between
licensees and licensors. That is, Southern firms can retain a greater fraction of the rent if
they possess greater bargaining power. The contracts between Northern and Southern firms
forbid every Southern licensee from breaking the agreement and imitating the blueprints to
avoid paying the license fee, and close monitoring ensures that this does not occur.
In order to focus on the progress of licensing, we make the following two assumptions.
First, no imitation by Southern followers occurs in equilibrium. We posit that Northern firms
maintain confidentiality when manufacturing their state-of-the-art products in the North.
Therefore, even if IPR protection is not perfectly enforced in the South, it is economically
and technologically impractical for Southern firms to copy the Northern firms’ products
manufactured in the North. On the other hand, weaker IPR protection in the South may
not prevent Southern followers from imitating a state-of-the-art product that is licensed to
a Southern firm.13 However, assuming that unauthorized imitators are obliged to compete
with the rightful licensee in a Bertrand fashion, they earn no positive profits as both types of
firm face the same marginal costs. This implies that imitators can never pay imitation costs
as long as they are strictly positive. Therefore, no imitator intends to enter the market. The
13Grossman and Lai (2004) explored the reason why IPR tend to be more weakly protected in the South
than in the North, and also examined methods of efficient patent protection in the global economy.
8
second assumption is that inward FDI is banned by the Southern governmental authorities
or is unfeasible.14 Hence, licensing is the unique means of international technology transfer
from the North to the South.
For tractability, we assume that the second-highest-quality product is always in the pub-
lic domain and that its specifications are freely available. This means that, at any time,
the nearest rivals of the leaders are Southern firms with the ability to produce goods of the
second-highest quality. These products can potentially be competitive against the state-of-
the-art products, despite the lower quality, because the equilibrium wage rate in the South is
lower than in the North. Then, to exclude rivals, every leader charges the same limit price,
as follows:
p = ¸wS; (2)
where wS is the wage rate in the South.
In equilibrium, two possible types of market activity exist: either the Southern licensee
produces the highest-quality good under license, or the Northern leader produces the state-
of-the-art variety of goods. Following Yang and Maskus (2001), we refer to the former as
the licensed South technology (S) market and the latter as the original North technology
(N) market. Assuming that a licensor is obliged to compete with its licensee in a Bertrand
fashion if it enters the product market, no licensor has an incentive to continue producing the
good for himself or herself in equilibrium. That is, once a license contract has been made, the
Southern licensee supplies the product monopolistically in both the Northern and Southern
markets. Whenever a Northern follower succeeds in innovation and produces a new higher-
quality product, the market would become N, which is independent of whether the targeted
market is N or S. Therefore, the research efforts of entrepreneurs indiscriminately range over
all ! because the expected gains from innovation are equal between industries, provided
14In practice, Japanese authorities adopted a restrictive policy towards FDI in the early stages of the devel-
opment process following World War II in order to encourage foreign firms to license advanced technology to
Japanese firms. See Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi (2005) and Peck (1976).
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that the leaders in each market are symmetrical; that is, provided that all leaders are equally
exposed to the danger of replacement by the next higher-quality product and that all Northern
leaders succeed equally in reaching agreement on licensing.
Under the pricing strategy (2), Northern leaders and Southern licensees make different
profits because costs differ. The price setting of each leader yields a demand per product of
E=¸wS . Therefore, each Northern leader earns a flow of profits as follows:
¼I = (¸w
S ¡ wN) 1
¸wS
= 1¡ w
N
¸wS
;
whereas each Southern licensee earns the following:
¼L = (¸w
S ¡ wS) 1
¸wS
= 1¡ 1
¸
;
where wN is the wage rate in the North, which must be restricted to be below ¸wS so that
the Northern leaders can earn a strictly positive profit.
We assume that the R&D process is modeled as a Poisson process following Grossman
and Helpman (1991). If a Northern firm i uses aI ~Ii units of the labor input in research for a
time interval of length dt, it succeeds in innovation with a probability of ~Iidt, where aI is a
parameter. The variable ~Ii, which is the Poisson arrival rate at which new technology will be
innovated in the next instant, is the intensity of R&D chosen endogenously by entrepreneurs.
As usual, the success of R&D depends not on the cumulated resources that have been spent
in the former period but only on the current spending resources. We let VI;t denote the
market value of representative leaders operating in the North at time t, i.e., the leaders that
belong to the N market. As successful innovators attain this market value, each entrepreneur
maximizes the expected net benefit, VI;t ~Iidt¡wNt aI ~Iidt. In equilibrium with a finite size of
R&D investment, we must have:
VI;t · wNt aI with equality whenever ~Ii > 0: (3)
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Similarly, the formation of a license contract follows a Poisson process. The negotiations
leading to agreement on a new license contract between the licensor and the licensee and
adaptations to a new technique after the agreement are most likely time consuming. How-
ever, the lengths of time involved may be uncertain. Therefore, we take licensing negotiation
to be costly and assume that a Southern firm i that wishes to be licensed must input aL~¶i=·
units of labor per unit of time in order to attain success with an instantaneous probability of
~¶i. Let aL be a parameter, while ~¶i denotes the intensity of a licensing agreement that is op-
timally chosen by the Southern firm.15 We let · be a parameter representing circumstances
that influence the speed of negotiations and subsequent adaptations to a licensed technique.
For example, the speed of progress in a license negotiation may depend on the degree of
establishment of laws and regulations on the contract in the developing country. Moreover,
strict enforcement of punishment on infringement of a contract may ease the patent holder’s
fear involved with licensing and thus enable swift agreement between the parties concerned.
One possibility is that the educational level in the developing country may affect the ability
to adapt an unknown technique. Hence, we regard · as an index reflecting all of these factors
and representing the “smoothness” of negotiations.
If a Northern firm and a Southern firm agree on a license, they split the expected present
value of joint profits earned by the Southern firm, VL;t. The Southern firm i, which under-
takes licensing negotiations at the intensity ~¶i during a time interval dt, receives an expected
gain of (1 ¡ ±)VL;t~¶idt, where 0 < ± < 1 denotes the exogenously determined license fee
rate. Hence, a Southern firm under licensing negotiations decides on an intensity ~¶i to max-
imize its expected payoff, (1 ¡ ±)VL;t~¶idt ¡ wSt (aL=·)~¶idt. In equilibrium, the Southern
firm’s decision requires a zero-profit condition as follows:
VL;t · wSt
aL=·
1¡ ± with equality whenever ~¶i > 0: (4)
15In Yang and Maskus (2001), Northern leaders spend resources in order to transfer the technology to the
South. However, as stated in the introduction, our setting appears more realistic, at least in the historical case
of Japan and Korea.
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On the other hand, a Northern patent holder that has not yet granted a license may refuse
a Southern firm’s offer. If a Northern firm obtains a smaller expected market value from
granting a license than it obtains by continuing to operate in the North on its own account,
then the Northern firm will prefer not to grant a license. Therefore, for a license contract to
take place at time t, the stock value of a Northern licensor must exceed that of the Northern
current leader that has not yet granted a license: that is:
VI;t · ±VL;t: (5)
The measures of products that belong to the S market at time t, nSt , change over time. A
measure of inflow into the S market is equal to the measure of newly licensed industries in
the N market at time t, whereas the outflow out of the S market is equal to the measure of
industries in the S market where innovation occurs at time t. As in Grossman and Helpman
(1991), we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium. In the equilibrium, every leader in
the N market reaches a licensing agreement at the same aggregate intensity ¶t =
P
i ~¶i, and
every incumbent leader in the economy is exposed to the danger of being replaced by the
invention of a higher quality product at the same aggregate intensity It =
P
i
~Ii. For a time
interval dt, a new agreement is made about licensing in ¶tnNt dt industries of the N market,
where nNt ´ 1¡ nSt is a measure of the N market. In addition, innovation occurs in ItnSt dt
industries of the S market and ItnNt dt industries of the N market in the same time interval.
Therefore, nSt must follow the following equation of motion:
_nSt = ¶tn
N
t ¡ ItnSt : (6)
We now consider how the market value of each firm varies over time. Shareholders
of a firm in the S market earn dividends ¼Ldt and capital gains _VLdt over a time interval
of length dt if no follower succeeds in innovating a new state-of-the-art product in the in-
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dustry. However, the stock of each firm becomes worthless if the product is replaced by a
higher-quality product during the interval dt. The probability that this occurs is equal to the
probability that innovation succeeds in the industry in the time interval, Itdt. Provided that
these idiosyncratic risks are properly diversified away by all investors, a stock should yield
exactly the same expected rate of return as the risk-free interest rate, r(t). The no-arbitrage
condition between the stock of a firm in the S market and a riskless asset is then:
r(t)VL;t = ¼L;t + _VL;t ¡ ItVL;t: (7)
The no-arbitrage condition for the stock of Northern leaders in the N market is, however,
more complex. The shareholders of a leader in the N market earn dividends ¼Idt and capital
gains _VIdt if no innovation occurs in the industry, while suffering a total capital loss of
amount VI with a probability of Itdt. In addition, the stock value transforms into ±VL if
the firm succeeds in reaching an agreement with a Southern firm about licensing during dt,
the probability of which corresponds to ¶tdt. Northern leaders in the N market take the
instantaneous probability ¶t as given, notwithstanding its endogeneity, because it is selected
by Southern followers. The sum of these risky returns must be identical to the risk-free
interest. Therefore, we obtain the no-arbitrage condition between the stock of a leader in the
N market and a riskless asset, as follows:
r(t)VI;t = ¼I;t + _VI;t ¡ ItVI;t + ¶t(±VL;t ¡ VI;t) if ¶t > 0: (8)
Finally, we close the model by describing the labor market-clearing conditions. Let the
labor supply be LN and LS in the North and South, respectively, where both are exogenously
given. The total manufacturing employment in the South equals nSt E(t)=(¸wSt ), whereas in
the North it equals nNt E(t)=(¸wSt ). The R&D sector in the North employs aIIt(nSt + nNt )
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units of labor. Labor-market clearing in the Northern market requires that:
1
¸wSt
nNt + aIIt(n
S
t + n
N
t ) = L
N : (9)
On the other hand, the labor input for licensing negotiations by Southern follower firms is
equal to (aL=·)¶tnNt . Hence, the Southern labor-market-clearing condition becomes:
1
¸wSt
nSt +
aL
·
¶tn
N
t = L
S: (10)
3 The Equilibrium Path
We now derive the equilibrium path of the economy. First, we compute innovation and
licensing intensity in the equilibrium. Substituting the zero-profit condition in licensing (4)
into the Northern labor-market-clearing condition (9), we have:
It =
LN
aI
¡ aL=·
aI(1¡ ±)¸
1¡ nSt
VL;t
whenever It > 0 and ¶t > 0: (11)
Similarly, from the zero-profit condition in licensing (4) and the Southern labor-market-
clearing condition (10), we obtain:
¶t =
1
1¡ nSt
·
LS
aL=·
¡ 1
(1¡ ±)¸
nSt
VL;t
¸
whenever ¶t > 0: (12)
Note that both innovation and licensing intensity depend only on the two endogenous vari-
ables, nSt and VL;t. No innovation (It = 0) and no licensing (¶t = 0) take place when the
right-hand sides of (11) and (12), respectively, become negative. However, we focus our
attention on the region where both It > 0 and ¶t > 0.
Next, we compute the evolution of variables nSt and VL;t. Substituting equations (11)
14
and (12) into (6), we can rewrite the equation of motion for nSt as follows:
_nSt =
LS
aL=·
¡
½
LN
aI
+
1
(1¡ ±)¸VL;t
·
1¡ aL=·
aI
(1¡ nSt )
¸¾
nSt : (13)
In addition, using r(t) = ½ for all t and combining (7) with (11), we derive the equation of
motion for VL;t as follows:
_VL;t =
µ
½+
LN
aI
¶
VL;t ¡
·
aL=·
aI(1¡ ±)¸(1¡ n
S
t ) +
µ
1¡ 1
¸
¶¸
: (14)
Equations (13) and (14) form an autonomous system of two differential equations in nSt and
VL;t. Therefore, we can examine the dynamic behavior of these two variables separately
from the remaining variables. In this system, nSt is a state variable, whereas VL;t is a jump
variable.
Figure 1 depicts the phase diagram for this system on the (nS; VL) plane. The intersec-
tion of the two curves _nSt = 0 and _VL;t = 0 at point A is the fixed point of this system. The
shaded area represents a region in which both research and licensing do not occur. Recalling
equations (11) and (12), we focus on the region where the following two inequalities are
satisfied:
VL;t >
aL=·
(1¡ ±)¸LN (1¡ n
S
t ); (15)
and
VL;t >
aL=·
(1¡ ±)¸LS n
S
t : (16)
The equation for the _nSt = 0-locus is represented by:
VL =
(aL=·)
(1¡ ±)¸
©
(aL=·)n
S + [aI ¡ (aL=·)]
ª
nS
aILS ¡ (aL=·)LNnS ; (17)
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whereas the equation for the _VL;t = 0-locus is given by:
VL =
1
¸(LN + aI½)
·
aL=·
1¡ ± + aI(¸¡ 1)
¸
¡ aL=·
(1¡ ±)¸(LN + aI½)n
S: (18)
The _nSt = 0-locus is upward sloping and remains in a finite region provided that innovation
requires more labor inputs than licensing in order to attain a certain probability of success
and that the South is endowed with relatively abundant labor. In greater detail, the conditions
are:
aL
·
< aI and
aL=·
aI
LN · LS: (19)
Furthermore, to ensure that the two loci cross once, we assume that:
(aL=·)(L
N + aI½)¡ (1¡ ±)(¸¡ 1)[aILS ¡ (aL=·)LN ] > 0: (20)
The inequality is the condition such that the VL coordinate of the _nSt = 0-locus exceeds that
of the _VL;t = 0-locus at nS = 1. As the _VL;t = 0-locus lies above the _nSt = 0-locus at
nS = 0, the two loci cross at least once if the restriction is fulfilled. This economy may
then have a steady state that is a saddle point under appropriate additional assumptions.
Moreover, in the steady state, a strictly positive fraction of products is under license and
manufactured in the South.
To characterize the economy completely and seek out the steady state, we must investi-
gate the evolution of the third variable, VI;t. Imposing It > 0 and ¶t > 0, from equations
(3), (4), (8), (11), and (12), we obtain the equation of motion for VI;t, as follows:
_VI;t =
·µ
½+
LN
aI
¶
+
nSt
(1¡ ±)¸VL;t
µ
aL=·
aI
¡ 1
1¡ nSt
¶
+
LS
aL=·
1
1¡ nSt
¸
VI;t
¡ 1¡ ±L
S
aL=·
VL;t
1¡ nSt
+
±
(1¡ ±)¸
nSt
1¡ nSt
: (21)
Using the three variables, nSt ; VL;t; and VI;t, we state some conditions under which a
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feasible steady state of the economy exists. Let ¹nS; ¹VL; and ¹VI denote the values of the fixed
points in the differential equation system composed of (13), (14), and (21). The condition
(5) must then be imposed on ¹VL and ¹VI so that the steady state is attainable. Moreover,
in equilibrium, the Southern wage rate must be less than the Northern wage rate, while
the Northern wage rate cannot exceed the Southern wage rate multiplied by ¸, i.e., wSt <
wNt < ¸w
S
t . Under the assumptions that It > 0 and ¶t > 0, from equations (3) and (4), the
condition is described as follows:
aI(1¡ ±)
aL=·
VL;t < VI;t <
aI(1¡ ±)¸
aL=·
VL;t: (22)
In addition, in order that both innovation and licensing take place in the steady state, ¹nS and
¹VL must take values that satisfy (15) and (16). This restriction corresponds to intersection
A in figure 1 falling outside the shaded area because the point represents the coordinate of
(¹nS; ¹VL). If nSt ; VL;t; and VI;t satisfy all of those conditions and the steady state is attainable,
it is a saddle point (see Appendix). These results are stated as the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that parameters are under conditions (19) and (20). Then, the
economy has a steady state with positive innovation and licensing if the steady-state values
¹nS; ¹VL, and ¹VI satisfy all of the conditions (5), (15), (16), and (22). Moreover, the steady
state is a saddle point.
A numerical example of parameters where the steady state exists is provided in the next
section. As nSt is a state variable, the saddle path converging to the steady state is the
equilibrium trajectory. Along this saddle path, the fraction of licensed products increases
over time when the economy is below its steady-state value.
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4 Effects of Changes in the Smoothness of Negotiation and
Rent Distribution
In this section, we investigate the effects of an improvement in the smoothness of license
negotiation and an increase in the license fee rate. In the first part of this section, we analyze
the long- and short-run effects of the improvement in the smoothness of license negotiation.
Later, we examine the long- and short-run effects of higher license fee rates.
4.1 An improvement in the smoothness of license negotiation
The improvement in the smoothness of license negotiation is expressed by an increase in ·.
First, we examine the long-run effect on innovation and licensing by conducting compara-
tive statics. Combining equations (17) and (18), we derive ¹nS as a positive solution of the
following equation:
a2L½(¹n
S)2 +B¹nS ¡ C = 0; (23)
where:
B ´ aL·
©
LS + aI½+ L
N [¸¡ (¸¡ 1)±]ª¡ a2L½ > 0;
C ´ ·LS [aL + aI(1¡ ±)·(¸¡ 1)] > 0:
Taking a total differential of the equation (23), we obtain:
@¹nS
@·
=
1
2a2L½¹n
S +B
µ
@C
@·
¡ @B
@·
¹nS
¶
: (24)
This equation shows that an increase in · increases the fraction of licensed products as
long as (@B=@·)¹nS < @C=@·. Noting that @B=@· = (B+a2L½)=· and @C=@· = (C=·)+
aI(1¡±)·(¸¡1)LS , from the condition on parameters and equation (23), we can verify that
@C=@·¡ (@B=@·)¹nS is greater than (aL=·)[(1¡ ±)·(¸¡1)LN ¡aL½(1¡ ¹nS)]. Exploiting
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condition (15), which is necessary for the steady state with positive innovation, and equation
(18) representing the _VL = 0-locus, we obtain (1¡±)·(¸¡1)LN¡aL½(1¡¹nS) > 0. Hence,
@C=@· is always larger than (@B=@·)¹nS; that is, @¹nS=@· > 0 in any case.
The effect on the value of ¹VL is computed by using the effect on ¹nS . As the fixed point of
the system is located on the _VL;t = 0-locus, ¹VL is related to ¹nS by equation (18). Therefore,
the long-run response of VL;t to a change in · is given by:
@ ¹VL
@·
= ¡ aL=·
(1¡ ±)¸(LN + aI½)
µ
1¡ ¹nS
·
+
@¹nS
@·
¶
< 0: (25)
Exploiting the above, we can examine how an increase in · affects the remaining vari-
ables. First, we calculate the long-run effect on innovation. As the innovation intensity at
time t satisfies (11), taking the derivative of ¹I with respect to ·, we obtain the following:
@ ¹I
@·
=
aL=·
aI(1¡ ±)¸ ¹VL
µ
@¹nS
@·
+
1¡ ¹nS
·
+
1¡ ¹nS
¹VL
@ ¹VL
@·
¶
: (26)
The above equation shows that the change in · affects ¹I through three channels: through the
change of ¹nS , the direct effect, and the change of ¹VL. These effects are competing because
whereas the first two effects encourage innovation, the third effect weakens the incentive
for innovation. However, using equations (18) and (25), we can immediately confirm that
@ ¹I=@· > 0. That is, the first two positive effects dominate the third negative effect, and the
increase in · induces greater innovation in the long run.
Intuitively, an increase in · has two effects that lead to a decrease in Northern labor
employed in the production sector. First, more products are manufactured in the South under
license. This is because Southern firms are more eager to engage in license negotiations
because they require less labor to attain a unit probability of successfully achieving a license
agreement. This first effect is expressed by the first term in parentheses in equation (26).
Second, there is less demand for each product and, therefore, less demand for labor from
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each incumbent leader. The reduction in demand occurs because the stronger incentives to
undertake licensing negotiations caused by an increase in · lead to a rise in the Southern
wage rate, as verified later. An increase in the Southern wage rate involves higher prices
for products as each leader adopts a limit-pricing strategy to compete with the Southern
closest rivals. This second effect is expressed by the second and third terms in parentheses
in equation (26). These two effects decrease labor demand from Northern incumbent leaders
and, consequently, increase the labor input for R&D activities in the steady state.
In addition, an increase in · positively affects licensing intensity in the long run. As
equation (6) implies that ¹¶ = ¹I¹nS=(1¡ ¹nS) in the steady state, the effect of the rise in · on
¹¶ is given by:
@¹¶
@·
=
¹nS
1¡ ¹nS
@ ¹I
@·
+
¹I
(1¡ ¹nS)2
@¹nS
@·
> 0:
Moreover, the aggregate amount of licenses, ¹nN¹¶, is positively related to ·. We can summa-
rize the above analysis as the following proposition.
Proposition 2: An improvement in the smoothness of license negotiation promotes both in-
novation and licensing in the long run.
Furthermore, our model can answer another related and important question: does the
improvement encourage innovation and licensing in the short run as well as the long run?
Many related studies are unable to respond to this kind of question because they focus only
on the steady state. In contrast, our analysis enables us to examine the short-run effect
because it fully describes the progress of the economy.
To investigate the short-run effect, we exploit the same approach as Helpman (1993).16
For tractability, we restrict the analysis to an economy that initially stays in the steady state:
namely, nS0 = ¹nS . Then suppose that an unanticipated marginal increase in · occurs at time
0. We can calculate the first-order response of (nSt ; VL;t) to the marginal increase in · from
a linearized system of the differential equations (13) and (14) around the steady-state value.
16Kwan and Lai (2003) have adopted the same method in their closed economy model.
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In the Appendix, we show that:
@nSt
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
= (1¡ e¡xt)@¹n
S
@·
; (27)
and
@VL;t
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
=
@ ¹VL
@·
+ ¤e¡xt
@¹nS
@·
; (28)
where x is the absolute value of the negative eigenvalue of the linearized coefficient matrix,
and ¤, which represents the second element of the eigenvector associated with the negative
eigenvalue, is also positive. Because It follows equation (11), taking into consideration
the initial condition nS0 = ¹nS and the condition @nS0 =@· = 0, we can derive the effect on
innovation intensity at time 0, as follows:
@I0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S ;VL;0=¹VL
=
(aL=·)(1¡ ¹nS)
aI(1¡ ±)·¸ ¹VL
Ã
1 +
·
¹VL
@VL;0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
!
:
This equation suggests that the extent to which the innovation intensity responds to the
increase in · depends on the elasticity of VL;0 with respect to ·. If the elasticity exceeds ¡1,
then @I0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL is positive: that is, innovation is stimulated with an increase in ·
in the short and long term. To compute the elasticity, we must know the value of @VL;0=@·.
However, equation (28) implies that @VL;0=@·jnS0=¹nS is greater than @ ¹VL=@·. As we can
verify that (·= ¹VL)(@ ¹VL=@·) > ¡1 (see the Appendix), we conclude that the elasticity of
VL;0 with respect to · evaluated at the steady-state value also exceeds ¡1. As a result, we
show that @I0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL > 0.
Similarly, using equation (12), we have the short-run effect on licensing intensity as
follows:
@¶0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S ;VL;0=¹VL
=
1
1¡ ¹nS
"
LS
aL
+
¹nS
(1¡ ±)¸( ¹VL)2
@VL;0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
#
: (29)
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We can confirm that this @¶0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL is also greater than zero (see the Appendix).
Thus, these results prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The improvement in the smoothness of license negotiation promotes both
innovation and licensing in the short run as in the long run.
How are the wages in both countries affected by an increase in · in the steady state? As
discussed, the Southern wage rate in the steady state rises unambiguously. Using equation
(4), we obtain:
@ ¹wS
@·
=
1¡ ±
aL
¹VL +
(1¡ ±)·
aL
@ ¹VL
@·
> 0: (30)
Turning to the relative wage rate between the North and the South, we may have difficulty in
computing the effect because the impact on the Northern wage rate is unclear. Therefore, by
using some numerical examples of parameters, we have examined the effect on the relative
wage rate (see figure 2).17 As a result, we found that the relative wage rate of the South is
monotonically increasing with an increase in · for all parameter values chosen.
4.2 A higher license fee rate
An increase in the license fee rate is represented by an increase in ±. The higher license fee
rate means that the Northern licensors can enjoy a larger monopolistic rent after the licenses,
whereas the Southern licensees receive a smaller rent. In the first part of this subsection, we
examine the comparative statics with respect to ±. Next, we show the short-run effect of the
increase in ± on innovation and licensing agreements by exploiting the same approach as
employed in the previous subsection.
In order to derive the long-run effects, we first compute the derivative of ¹nS and ¹VL with
17Figure 2 is an output of the numerical calculation. In the figure, we specify the parameters as aI = 7; aL =
3:5; ¸ = 1:5; LN = 1; LS = 2, and ½ = 0:05. Other examples are available from the authors upon request.
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respect to ±. Totally differentiating equation (23) implies that:
@¹nS
@±
= ¡·(¸¡ 1)(aI·L
S ¡ aLLN ¹nS)
2a2L½¹n
S +B
< 0: (31)
Furthermore, using the _VL = 0-locus, we can derive the following:
@ ¹VL
@±
=
aL=·
(1¡ ±)¸(LN + aI½)
µ
1¡ ¹nS
1¡ ± ¡
@¹nS
@±
¶
> 0: (32)
The first term of this expression represents the direct effect of a change in ±, whereas the
second represents the indirect effect that occurs through the change of ¹nS . These effects
complement each other and shift ¹VL in the same direction. Consequently, ¹VL responds posi-
tively to an increase in share of Northern rents.
Using the above derivatives, we compute @ ¹I=@± using the same method as in the pre-
vious subsection. The effects of a change in ± on innovation intensity in the steady state
are:
@ ¹I
@±
=
aL=·
aI(1¡ ±)¸ ¹VL
µ
@¹nS
@±
¡ 1¡ ¹n
S
1¡ ± +
1¡ ¹nS
¹VL
@ ¹VL
@±
¶
< 0: (33)
The change in ± affects ¹I through three channels: a change in ¹nS , a direct effect, and a
change in ¹VL. An intuitive interpretation is as follows. First, as shown, a higher ± results in a
lower ¹nS; that is, more leaders begin to operate in the North. The expansion of industries be-
longing to the N market creates additional Northern labor demand from incumbent leaders,
which leads to lower innovation intensity. The first term in parentheses in (33) represents
this effect. Second, the higher ± discourages Southern followers from pursuing licensing
efforts and reduces the Southern wage rate because of its lower return, all other things re-
maining unchanged. The lower Southern wage rate obliges the incumbent leaders to charge
a lower price and generates additional product demand. As a result, Northern labor demand
from each incumbent leader is also increasing with ±. The second and the third terms in
parentheses in (33) represent the second effect. These two effects increase the labor demand
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from Northern incumbent leaders and, consequently, decrease ¹I .
The effects on licensing intensity ¹¶ are computed in the same way as in the previous
subsection. @¹¶=@± is derived by:
@¹¶
@±
=
¹I
(1¡ ¹nS)2
@¹nS
@±
+
¹nS
1¡ ¹nS
@ ¹I
@±
< 0:
As both @¹nS=@± and @ ¹I=@± are negative, @¹¶=@± is also negative. Hence, a higher license fee
rate reduces the efforts of Southern followers to negotiate a license contract in the long run.
Next, we investigate the short-run effects of a change in rent sharing on innovation
and licensing. Using analogues of equations (27) and (28), we obtain: @VL;0=@±jnS0=¹nS =
(@ ¹VL=@±) + ¤(@¹n
S=@±) and @nS0 =@± = 0 for the economy that initially stays in the steady
state. Hence, equations (11) and (12) imply that:
@I0
@±
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S ;VL;0=¹VL
=
(aL=·)(1¡ ¹nS)
aI(1¡ ±)¸ ¹VL
·
¡ 1
1¡ ± +
1
¹VL
µ
@ ¹VL
@±
+ ¤
@¹nS
@±
¶¸
;
and
@¶0
@±
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S ;VL;0=¹VL
=
¹nS
(1¡ ±)¸(1¡ ¹nS) ¹VL
·
¡ 1
1¡ ± +
1
¹VL
µ
@ ¹VL
@±
+ ¤
d¹nS
d±
¶¸
:
Using equations (18), (31), and (32), and the definition of B, we can verify that ¡[1=(1 ¡
±)] + (1= ¹VL)(@ ¹VL=@±) is less than zero. Thus, both innovation and licensing intensity at
time zero respond negatively to an increase in the license fee rate.
Finally, we examine the effect of an increase in ± on the Southern wage rate and the
relative wage rate in the steady state. Equation (4) implies that:
@ ¹wS
@±
=
(1¡ ±) ¹VL
aL=·
µ
¡ 1
1¡ ± +
1
¹VL
@ ¹VL
@±
¶
< 0: (34)
Therefore, a higher ± pushes the Southern wage rate down in the steady state. Moreover,
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we ascertain the tendency of the effects on the Southern relative wage rate by using some
numerical examples (see figure 2). From the results, we found under reasonable ranges of
parameters that the Southern relative wage rate is monotonically decreasing with ±.
The above results are summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 4: A higher license fee rate reduces both innovation and licensing in both the
long and short run.
This proposition suggests that an excessively high license fee rate results in low licensing
efforts and interferes with the smooth transfer of production to the South. In addition, as
the Southern wage rate falls with the license fee rate, manufacturing per firm in the N mar-
ket increases. These two effects lead to greater production in the North, which discourages
innovation through a decrease in labor inputs for research. As a result, lower quality im-
provements take place, and the expected duration of existing products increases.
4.3 Discussion
How can these results be compared with those of Yang and Maskus? Yang and Maskus have
argued that strengthening IPR protection in the South promotes innovation and technology
licensing in the long run. They do so by assuming that stronger IPR protection in the South
has two influences: an increase in the probability of success in licensing for a given resource
spending and an increase in the licensor’s share of rents. Yang and Maskus named the
former “the size effect” of strengthening IPR and the latter “the distribution effect”. In
addition, they concluded that “the size effect and the distribution effect would enhance each
other in encouraging more licensing and more innovation in response to stronger Southern
protection of intellectual property” (Yang and Maskus, 2001, p.182).
In comparison with Yang and Maskus, our analysis in section 4.1 shows that an improve-
ment in the smoothness of licensing negotiation, corresponding to the size effect in Yang and
Maskus’ analysis, encourages innovation and licensing. Therefore, our analysis of proposi-
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tion 2 can be interpreted as proof that Yang and Maskus’ conclusion that the size effect of
strengthening IPR encourages innovation and licensing in the long run holds, even if their
model is modified to have a stable path converging to the steady state. Moreover, we obtain
a richer conclusion on the short-run effects than Yang and Maskus. Thus, one can regard
our analysis in section 4.1 as reinforcing and extending the Yang and Maskus argument on
the size effect induced by stronger IPR protection.
In contrast, our analysis in section 4.2 shows that an increase in the license fee rate
discourages innovation and licensing in the long run, as opposed to the analysis of the dis-
tribution effect in Yang and Maskus. We can interpret causes of this significant difference
between our analysis and Yang and Maskus as follows: in a Yang and Maskus setting,
Northern patent holders take an active part in the technology transfer to developing coun-
tries. Therefore, when tighter IPR induce a higher rent share for licensors, Northern leaders
have more incentive to engage in license activities. This accelerates both licensing and in-
novation. On the other hand, in our setting, Southern firms that hope to be granted a license
play an important role in the technology transfer. Because a higher license fee rate leads to a
lower rent share for licensees, Southern followers have fewer incentives to engage in license
negotiation activities under the higher license fee rate. This slows down both licensing and
innovation. Consequently, our results concerning an increase in the license fee rate lie op-
posite to that in Yang and Maskus. Thus, from our analysis in section 4.2, one can draw the
conclusion that Yang and Maskus’ argument concerning the distribution effect is not robust
and is crucially dependent on their assumption that patent holders themselves make an ef-
fort to license the Southern firms to sell the products. From this comparison between our
model and that in Yang and Maskus, we can surmise that whether an increase in ± enhances
technology transfer and innovation depends largely on who plays an important role in tech-
nology transfer. In order to obtain a more general result, we need to examine the effect of
the licensing fee in a more general model where Northern firms, as well as Southern firms,
devote their resources to licensing activities. Examination of such a general model remains
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an important task for future study. We provide a related discussion about this general model
in the conclusion.
5 A Comparison with Models with Imitation
In this subsection, in order to show the differences between licensing and imitation as al-
ternative channels that transfer technology from the North to the South, we compare the
characteristics and results of the present technology licensing model with such an imitation
model as Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.12).
The basic structure of our model is similar to the North–South quality-ladder model
with endogenous innovation and imitation.18 We can obtain a model where the channel of
technology transfer is imitation by making a few changes in the present licensing model.
Envisage that Southern follower firms in our model spend labor not to negotiate a licensing
agreement with patent holders but to imitate products. We then interpret ¶ as the probability
of success in imitation and interpret wSaL=· as the unit cost of imitation. In the case of
technology transfer through imitation, a Southern firm can earn all of the monopoly profits
without paying a license fee at each point of time if the firm succeeds in the technology
transfer, while a Northern innovator cannot obtain profits after the success of imitation in
the industry. If we set ± = 0 in equations (4) and (8), we could consider the equations
to be the zero-profit condition for the imitation activities and the no-arbitrage condition
concerning the stocks of the Northern firms, respectively. Moreover, we note that our model
can be regarded as a model with endogenous innovation and imitation by ignoring condition
(5).
In fact, it is the existence of the license fee and the condition (5) that are a key feature
in separating our technology licensing model from other endogenous imitation models. In
the case that a Southern follower firm offers a Northern patent holder a license contract, we
18The similarity between licensing and imitation in our model was pointed out by an anonymous referee.
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consider the possibility that the Northern patent holder refuses the offer as discussed above.
For example, if the license fee rate ± were zero, a patent holder would never enter into a
license contract. As a result, no equilibrium with positive licensing would exist in the case
where the license fee rate is too low. To exclude this possibility and ensure a sufficiently
high license fee rate, we imposed the condition (5). As long as this condition is satisfied,
reaching license agreement is beneficial not only to the Southern firm granted the license
but also to the Northern patent holder. Meanwhile, if a Southern firm imitates the design
of a state-of-the-art product without the permission of the patent holder, then we do not
have to take into account the possibility that the Southern firm fails in the imitation activity
through the objections of the patent holder. Therefore we do not need to impose a condition
corresponding to condition (5) in the technology licensing model. However, in the case of
technology transfer through imitation, a Southern imitator benefits from succeeding in the
imitation at the cost of the monopolistic rent of the Northern patent holder.
By utilizing the similarities between our technology licensing model and endogenous
imitation models, and the results of sections 4.1 and 4.2, we can compare the effects of an
increase in · and ± in the case of licensing with those in the case of imitation that corresponds
to the model where ± is set at 0 and condition (5) is not imposed.19 Applying proposition 3 to
the case of ± = 0, we can show that a decrease in imitation cost (an increase in ·) promotes
innovation and imitation in both the short and long run. Hence, it is concluded that whether
the channel of technology transfer is licensing or imitation, a decrease in cost for technology
transfer enhances not only technology transfer but also innovation. In addition, according to
proposition 4, the intensities of innovation and licensing, ¹I and ¹¶, are decreasing functions of
±. Therefore the intensities are maximized at ± = 0. This implies that innovation, as well as
technology transfer, is more active when the channel of technology transfer is imitation than
when the channel of technology transfer is licensing. It may be somewhat counterintuitive
19Though we can obtain the results concerning innovation and imitation by using this similarity, we cannot
easily obtain results concerning the relative wage rate between the North and the South and welfare, because
we need to examine the dynamics of VI;t to derive the relative wage rate and welfare on the equilibrium paths.
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that more innovation occurs in the case of imitation than in the case of licensing because
the Northern innovator can receive the rent after technology transfer in the case of licensing
but not in the case of imitation. The interpretation is similar to that of proposition 4: since
the existence of a license fee that partly discourages Southern follower firms from acquiring
advanced technologies leads to the lower frequency of technology transfer to the South, as
it causes more production and fewer research activities in the North.
6 Concluding Remarks
The international transfer of technology is brought about through various channels, includ-
ing licensing. This paper has presented a quality-ladder type of product-cycle model where
licensing is introduced as the channel of technology diffusion. In this model, we supposed
that firms in developing countries must incur costs and input resources in their efforts to win
a license contract. In practice, such licensee firms often play an important role in reduc-
ing technological backwardness in recipient countries. Our model captures the activity of
firms in the recipient countries and shows the existence of the steady state in which positive
innovation and licensing continue to take place.
An important advantage of our analysis is that we fully explore the dynamic nature of the
economy. As a result, we have succeeded in verifying that the steady state in the economy
is a saddle point. Moreover, owing to the analysis of the dynamic system, our study has
yielded some results with respect to the short-run effects of a change in the parameters.
Many existing studies compromise such analysis by only drawing conclusions about the
long-run effects, whereas our dynamic analysis enables us to determine both the short-run
and the long-run effects.
Although the model developed in this paper will assist us to comprehend better inno-
vation and international transfer of technology through licensing, some topics are left open
for future research. For instance, one could consider a “hybrid” between our model and
29
that presented in Yang and Maskus. In that model, Northern firms could use their resources
for licensing activities, for example, to monitor the transfer of technology, and the Southern
firms could use their resources for licensing negotiations. To maintain simplicity, we have
assumed that only Southern firms use their resources to reach a license agreement, while
Yang and Maskus assumed that only Northern firms use their resources to succeed in licens-
ing. Because the difference in assumptions generates the distinct stability property of the
steady state between our model and that in Yang and Maskus, examination of the stability
of the hybrid model remains an important task for future studies. Perhaps one may be able
to discover a range of parameters that stand for the labor inputs of both parties necessary to
the licensing activities in which the stability of the hybrid model is ensured.20
One could also consider an extended version of our model in the sense that licensing
and another mode of technology transfer coexist. So as to focus on licensing, we have
excluded channels of technology transfer other than licensing. Consequently, our analysis
is restricted in the following ways. First, our licensing model does not take into account
imitation activities, although these are widely observed and constitute a major source of
technology acquisition in the early development stage. On that point, our results are more
likely to be applied to middle-income countries than less-developed countries. Second, we
have assumed that foreign direct investment is impractical. In reality, however, there are
two types of middle-income developing countries: one encourages domestic firms to learn
advanced technologies through licensing from firms in developed countries, whereas the
other prefers FDI by multinational firms to licensing. Clearly, we take only the former as
the object of our analysis. Hence, to provide a North–South technology licensing model
where a mode of technology transfer exists in addition to licensing is also an important
topic for future study.21 Our model would probably then be a good starting point for these
20The authors thank an anonymous referee for these points.
21For example, Antra`s (2005) has constructed a simple model such that under the environment of incomplete
contracts, a Northern research firm can choose the mode of manufacturing: to transact with an independent
Southern firm (licensing) or to integrate the Southern manufacturing plant vertically (multinationalizing), al-
though the model assumed the innovation process to be exogenous for the purpose of simplicity.
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explorations.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the effect of an increase in · on innovation and licensing in
the short run. To do so, we first compute the negative eigenvalue and the corresponding
eigenvector of the system. The linearized system of (13), (14), and (21) is:
0BBBB@
_nSt
_VL;t
_VI;t
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
¡b11 b12 0
b21 b22 0
b31 b32 b33
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
nSt ¡ ¹nS
VL;t ¡ ¹VL
VI;t ¡ ¹VI
1CCCCA ; (35)
where:
b11 =
LN
aI
+
1
(1¡ ±)¸ ¹VL
·
1¡ aL=·
aI
(1¡ 2¹nS)
¸
> 0;
b12 =
¹nS
(1¡ ±)¸ ¹V 2L
·
1¡ aL=·
aI
(1¡ ¹nS)
¸
> 0;
b21 =
aL=·
aI(1¡ ±)¸ > 0;
b22 = ½+
LN
aI
> 0;
and
b33 = ½+
LN
aI(1¡ ¹nS) > 0;
while b31 and b32 are irrelevant to the analysis. The eigenequation associated with the coef-
ficient matrix on the right-hand side is:
(y ¡ b33)[y2 + (b11 ¡ b22)y ¡ b11b22 ¡ b12b21] = 0: (36)
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As the equation y2 + (b11 ¡ b22)y ¡ b11b22 ¡ b12b21 = 0 has one positive and one negative
solution, the eigenequation (36) has two positive and one negative solution. Therefore,
the steady state is a saddle point and there exists a stable saddle path converging to it. In
addition, recalling that nSt is a state variable, while VL;t and VI;t are jump variables, the
number of negative eigenvalues corresponds to that of the state variable.
Next, we compute the approximate saddle path around the steady state, using the lin-
earized system of differential equations (35). In integrating the linearized differential equa-
tions, we have to base our choice of free integral constants on the conditions that a stable
saddle path converges to the steady state and that nSt is a state variable whose initial value is
historically given. This procedure yields the following expressions:
nSt = ¹n
S + (nS0 ¡ ¹nS)e¡xt; (37)
VL;t = ¹VL ¡ ¤(nS0 ¡ ¹nS)e¡xt; (38)
where x is the absolute value of the negative eigenvalue, and ¤, which represents the abso-
lute value of the second element of an eigenvector associated with the negative eigenvalue,
is also positive. The definition of an eigenvalue and an eigenvector implies the following:
x =
1
2
(D + b11 ¡ b22); ¤ = 1
b12
(x¡ b11) = 1
2b12
(D ¡ b11 ¡ b22);
where D ´ [(b22 ¡ b11)2 + 4(b11b22 + b12b21)]1=2 > b11 + b22. Because equations (37)
and (38), of which the linearized stable saddle path consists, are consolidated into VL;t =
¡¤nSt + (¹VL +¤¹nS), the stable saddle path projecting on the (nS; VL) plane has a negative
slope.
Third, we compute the change of nSt and VL;t to an unexpected marginal rise of ·. Dif-
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ferentiating (37) and (38) with respect to ·, we obtain:
@nSt
@·
= (1¡ e¡xt)@¹n
S
@·
¡ (nS0 ¡ ¹nS)te¡xt
@x
@·
; (39)
@VL;t
@·
=
@ ¹VL
@·
+ ¤e¡xt
@¹nS
@·
¡ (nS0 ¡ ¹nS)e¡xt
@¤
@·
+ ¤(nS0 ¡ ¹nS)te¡xt
@x
@·
: (40)
As we consider that the economy initially stays in the steady state, namely, nS0 = ¹nS , the
second term of (39) and the last two terms of (40) are equal to zero. Hence, the derivatives
of nSt and VL;t with respect to · on the steady state are given by (27) and (28) in the text. In
particular, the size of the initial jump responding the policy change is derived as:
@VL;0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
=
@ ¹VL
@·
+ ¤
@¹nS
@·
:
Figure 3 depicts the situation where · increases. The figure indicates that @VL;0=@·jnS0=¹nS
is greater than @ ¹VL=@· because the stable saddle path inclines negatively. Therefore, the
elasticity of VL;0 with respect to · evaluating at the steady-state value is larger than that of
¹VL:
·
¹VL
@ ¹VL
@·
<
·
¹VL
@VL;0
@·
¯¯¯¯
nS0=¹n
S
:
Fourth, we show that (·= ¹VL)(@ ¹VL=@·) is greater than¡1 in order to prove @I0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL >
0. Substituting (24) into (25), we obtain:
@ ¹VL
@·
= ¡ aL=·
(2a2L½¹n
S +B)(1¡ ±)¸(LN + aI½)
£
·
1
·
(2a2L½¹n
S +B)(1¡ ¹nS) + @C
@·
¡ @B
@·
¹nS
¸
:
Then, let us notice the content of the square bracket of this equation. Using the equation (23),
we can readily verify that (2a2L½¹nS +B)(1¡ ¹nS) = (2a2L½+B)¹nS +(B¡2C). In addition,
from the definitions of B and C, @B=@· = (a2L½ + B)=· and @C=@· = ¡aLLS + 2C=·.
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Hence, we can rewrite @ ¹VL=@· as:
@ ¹VL
@·
= ¡ aL=·
(2a2L½¹n
S +B)(1¡ ±)¸(LN + aI½)
µ
a2L½
·
¹nS +
B
·
¡ aLLS
¶
: (41)
Therefore, exploiting (18) and (41), we obtain the following expression about the elasticity
of ¹VL with respect to ·:
·
¹VL
@ ¹VL
@·
= ¡ aL(a
2
L½¹n
S +B ¡ aL·LS)
(2a2L½¹n
S +B) [aL(1¡ ¹nS) + aI(1¡ ±)·(¸¡ 1)] : (42)
By using (23) we can show that the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (42)
is greater than the numerator and, thus, we conclude that (·= ¹VL)(@ ¹VL=@·) > ¡1 is true.
Hence, innovation intensity at time zero responds positively to a marginal increase in ·.
Finally, we confirm that @¶0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL is greater than zero. For the sake of the
confirmation, we show that (LS=aL)+[¹nS=(1¡±)¸( ¹VL)2](@ ¹VL=@·) > 0. As @VL;0=@·jnS0=¹nS
is larger than @ ¹VL=@·, the inequality and equation (29) imply @¶0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL > 0.
Using (18) and (41), together with the definition of B, we obtain:
LS
aL
+
·
¹nS
(1¡ ±)¸( ¹VL)2
¸
@ ¹VL
@·
=
(C ¡ aL·LS¹nS)
(2a2L½¹n
S +B) [aL(1¡ ¹nS) + aI(1¡ ±)·(¸¡ 1)]2 ·2LS
£ ©aL¹nS½(C ¡ aL·LS¹nS) + ·(LN + aI½)(C ¡ aL·LS)
+C[(1¡ ±)·(¸¡ 1)LN ¡ aL½(1¡ ¹nS)]
ª
:
Note that, from equations (15) and (18), the term (1 ¡ ±)·(¸ ¡ 1)LN ¡ aL½(1 ¡ ¹nS) is
positive under the situation with positive innovation in the steady state. Therefore, LS=aL +
[¹nS=(1 ¡ ±)¸ ¹VL](@ ¹VL=@·) is greater than zero. This means that licensing intensity at time
zero reacts positively to a marginal increase in ·; that is, @¶0=@·jnS0=¹nS ;VL;0=¹VL > 0.
Thus, the proof of proposition 3 has been completed.
34
References
[1] Antra`s, P., 2005, Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. American Economic
Review 95 (4), 1054–1073.
[2] Arnold, L. G., 2002, On the Growth Effects of North–South Trade: The Role of Labor
Market Flexibility. Journal of International Economics 58 (2), 451–466.
[3] Barro, R., Sala-i-Martin, X., 2004, Economic Growth, 2nd ed. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[4] Dinopoulos, E., Segerstrom, P. S., 2006, North–South Trade and Economic Growth.
mimeo, University of Florida.
[5] Dinopoulos, E., Syropoulos, C., 2006, Rent Protection as a Barrier to Innovation and
Growth. Economic Theory, forthcoming.
[6] Enos, J. L., Park, W. H., 1988, The Adoption and Diffusion of Imported Technology:
The Case of Korea. Croom Helm, New York.
[7] Glass, A. J., Saggi, K., 2002a, Licensing versus Direct Investment: Implications for
Economic Growth. Journal of International Economics 56 (1), 131–153.
[8] Glass, A. J., Saggi, K., 2002b, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment. Journal of International Economics 56 (2), 387–410.
[9] Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[10] Grossman, G. M., Lai, E. L.-C., 2004, International Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty. American Economic Review 94 (5), 1635–1653.
[11] Helpman, E., 1993, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights. Econo-
metrica 61 (6), 1247–1280.
[12] Hoekman, B. M., Maskus, K. E., Saggi, K., 2005, Transfer of Technology to Devel-
oping Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options. World Development 33
(10), 1587–1602.
[13] Kwan, Y. K., Lai, E. L.-C., 2003, Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Endoge-
nous Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27 (5), 853–873.
35
[14] Lai, E. L.-C., 1998, International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate
of Product Innovation. Journal of Development Economics 55 (1), 133–153.
[15] Li, C.-W., 2001, On the Policy Implications of Endogenous Technological Progress.
Economic Journal 111 (471), C164–C179.
[16] Ortigueira S., Santos, M. S., 1997, On the Speed of Convergence in Endogenous
Growth Models. American Economic Review 87 (3), 383–399.
[17] Ozawa, T., 1980, Government Control over Technology Acquisition and Firms’ Entry
into New Sectors: The Experience of Japan’s Synthetic-Fibre Industry. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 4 (2), 133–146.
[18] Pack, H., Saggi, K., 1997, Inflows of Foreign Technology and Indigenous Technolog-
ical Development. Review of Development Economics 1 (1), 81–98.
[19] Peck, M., 1976, Technology, in H. Patrick and H. Rosovsky, eds., Asia’s New Giant:
How the Japanese Economy Works. Brookings Institution Press, Washington.
[20] Segerstrom, P. S., 1998, Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects. American Eco-
nomic Review 88 (5), 1290–1310.
[21] Sener, F., 2006, Intellectual Property Rights and Rent Protection in a North–South
Product-Cycle Model. mimeo, Union College, New York.
[22] Steger, T. M., 2003, The Segerstrom Model: Stability, Speed of Convergence and
Policy Implications. Economics Bulletin 15 (4), 1–8.
[23] Temple, J., 2003, The Long-run Implications of Growth Theories. Journal of Eco-
nomic Surveys 17 (3), 497–510.
[24] Yang, G., Maskus, K. E., 2001, Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing, and Innova-
tion in an Endogenous Product-Cycle Model. Journal of International Economics 53
(1), 169–187.
36
1O
nS
¹nS
LS
LS+LN
aL=·
(1¡±)¸(LS+LN )
aL=·
(1¡±)¸LS
aI(¸¡1)
¸(LN+aI½)
¹VL
aI(aL=·)
(1¡±)¸[aILS¡(aL=·)LN ]
aL=·
(1¡±)¸LN
[(aL=·)+aI(1¡±)(¸¡1)]
(1¡±)¸(LN+aI½)
VL
A
_VL;t = 0 locus
_nSt = 0 locus
It = 0
¶t = 0
Figure 1: Phase diagram
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Figure 2: Relative wage rate corresponding to each value of ± and ·
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stable saddle path: convergence speed = x
¡¤@¹nS
@·
@ ¹VL
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@¹nS
@·
initial response = @VL;0
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¹VL
@·
+ ¤@¹n
S
@·
nS
VL
the old steady state
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O
Figure 3: Response to a rise of · at the initial time and in the long run
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